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Distributing Emissions Rights in the Global




It is widely accepted that citizens of the wealthiest nations have
contributed the most to climate change through high consumption and
greenhouse gas-intensive production, and that, in turn, climate change is
geographically most threatening to some of the world's poorest persons.
This inequitable situation - where the consumption habits of the wealthy
are understood to produce observable adverse effects on the less well-off -
suggests that assigning responsibility for climate change should involve an
appeal to principles of distributive justice. A just solution to climate change
has two main components. First, it should satisfy a goal of equal treatment
by rebalancing the existing distribution of economic and political influence
in order to give all nations the ability to s1hape the global institutions that
affect them. Second, it should reduce total global emissions while
equalizing among nations the consumption of greenhouse gas-producing
goods and activities. This Note suggests that the best way to satisfy both
requirements is to implement equal per capita allocation of emissions
rights (EPCA).'
t I would like to thank Professor Daniel Markovits for his generous assistance with this
paper. I would also like to thank Professor Douglas A. Kysar for his helpful comments, and
Professor Daniel C. Esty for giving me the research opportunity to explore the environment-
trade relationship.
1. Richard Starkey, Allocating Emissions Rights: Are Equal Shares, Fair Shares? 5 (Tyndall
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This Note begins in Part I with an account of the ethical considerations
that have so far figured into the international climate policy debate. In
concluding that these considerations are not sufficiently deep, Part II
appeals to a vision of global institutions that has been advanced by human
rights philosopher Thomas Pogge. As Pogge has argued, the world's most
important economic institutions are now interconnected such that they
give rise to transnational demands of justice.! Part III explains why the very
nature of climate change as a global problem gives weight to the assertion
that duties of justice apply across state borders. Further, the global
institutional order gives rise to duties that are even deeper than those that
Pogge suggests. Remedies that provide for compensatory wealth transfers
without altering the underlying scheme of entitlements not only frustrate
the right of all human beings to have a hand in shaping the institutions that
affect them, but also sustain a morally arbitrary distribution of advantage.
An initial indictment of the international negotiating framework therefore
can be deepened in a way that is particularly important for the climate
change context: climate negotiators for wealthy nations cannot fulfill their
extant duties to persons in other countries simply by agreeing to arbitrarily
more stringent reduction targets. Rather, as I argue in Part IV, they hold a
full duty of equal distribution when it comes to emissions rights. Part V
concludes by providing a series of suggestions for institutional reform.
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONs FRAMEWORK
International climate negotiations to date have consistently
emphasized the need for developed countries to take on the financial
burden of addressing climate change. The rationale for placing greater
requirements on developed countries has so far sounded in both corrective
and distributive justice. Under a "responsibility" notion of equity,
industrialized countries are required to pay for emissions reductions
because they have historically produced the bulk of the greenhouse gas
emissions that cause climate change. This approach, sometimes called the
"polluter pays" principle, is a corrective justice measure that reflects what
Jules Coleman and Arthur Ripstein call the "principle of fairness": the idea,
central to tort law, that people should bear the costs of their own activities.
Further, under an "ability to pay" notion of equity, developed countries are
expected to pay for the bulk of mitigation because they have greater
resources and, therefore, the capacity to do so.' In contrast to the polluter
pays principle, which entails identifying certain actors as having caused
climate change, the "ability to pay" approach is distributive in nature,
drawing on considerations of equality and social welfare.
Both conceptions of equity have figured, at least facially, in the
2. See THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 2008).
3. Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L. J. 91, 94 (1995).
4. Joseph E. Aldy, Per Capita Carbon Dioxide Emissions: Convergence of Divergence?, 33
ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 533, 534 (2006).
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assignment of emissions reduction targets. The Kyoto Protocol, hailed as
the "first step"s toward effective international emissions allocation,
introduced binding caps on emissions for developed country signatories
only.' Kyoto's text invoked the principle of "common but differentiated
responsibilities" (CBDR),7 first introduced in the Rio Declaration in 1992
and repeated by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC).' Before Kyoto, the Rio Declaration had presented
CBDR not only as a response to "the different contributions to global
environmental degradation" of different nations, but also as an
acknowledgement of "the pressures [societies of developed countries]
place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial
resources they command.",' In describing both the imbalance in historical
responsibility for climate change and the resource-intensive nature of life
in developed countries, the Rio Declaration treated both corrective and
distributive justice as relevant to a determination of who should bear the
costs of climate change.
The relatedness of corrective and distributive justice concerns accounts
for the Rio Declaration's reliance on both sets of principles. Historically
high levels of emissions-intensive production - which provide potential
grounds for applying corrective justice remedies - have facilitated the
generation of wealth in developed countries, in turn raising questions of
distributive justice." Historical emissions are therefore closely related to
ability to pay. This interconnectedness is not unique to the climate change
context. As Coleman and Ripstein have pointed out, problems of corrective
and distributive justice are, in general, fundamentally the same:2 the value
of distributive shares will fluctuate depending on which transfers are
considered wrongful." Because only "wrongful" transfers require
correction, establishing duties under both corrective and distributive
justice relies on how we draw the line between losses that require
compensation and losses that should be allowed to lie where they fall. In
this Note, I will focus on the need to ground responsibility for climate
5. Scott Barrett, Climate Treaties and the Imperative of Enforcement, 24 OXFORD REV. EcoN.
POL'Y 239, 241 (2008) ("Kyoto was to be followed by a sequence of other agreements... .").
6. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (Dec. 1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
7. Id. art. 10.
8. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, 1 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992)
[hereinafter Rio Declaration].
9. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC.
10. Rio Declaration, supra note 8, 91 7; see also Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6, art. 10;
UNFCCC, supra note 9 (calling for cooperation by all countries "in accordance with their
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and
economic conditions").
11. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565
(2008).
12. See Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 3.
13. Id. at 93.
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change harms in principles of distributive justice. My argument, however,
should not foreclose the possibility of a parallel need for remedies in
corrective justice.
In spite of its rhetoric, Kyoto's commitment to equality as actually
expressed in the UNFCCC negotiations is not particularly deep. The text of
the Kyoto Protocol addressed disparities in development through its
commitment to CBDR. Substantively, the treaty acknowledged concerns
about equity by imposing emissions reductions requirements on developed
countries but not developing countries. But the UNFCCC negotiations
process allowed economically powerful states to obtain caps that squared
with their capacity to reduce relative to current emission levels, while still
protecting their economic advantage. Worse, the world's largest per capita
polluter - the United States - refused to join the treaty even after exerting
significant bargaining power to shape it." Kyoto has ultimately failed its
own commitment to principles of distributive justice by providing for
insufficient reductions." In setting caps that were too high to avert the
harmful effects of climate change, Kyoto has continued to jeopardize the
security interests of those who are most vulnerable to those effects.
Critics of existing climate policy have argued that the Kyoto regime's
failure to place more stringent limits on emissions in developed countries
violates the rights of persons in developing countries." Political officials in
China and India, in rejecting recent suggestions that developing countries
should take on binding targets in the next international agreement, have
been particularly vocal about the need for a climate regime that reflects
principles of distributive justice. In a rare interview with Financial Times in
February 2009, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao noted that "it [was] difficult
for China to take quantified emission reduction quotas" at Copenhagen
that year because China is still in the early stages of development.17 At the
G8 summit in L'Aquila, Italy, on July 8, 2009, both China and India refused
to commit to specific goals for cutting emissions by 2050. Objections to
new commitments for developing countries often depend on a declared
"right to development" - a distributive justice concept that suggests that
developed countries must take responsibility for necessary emissions
reductions as long as there are gross economic inequalities among
14. Stephen M. Gardiner, Ethics and Global Climate Change, 114 ETHICS 555, 594 (2004)
("[Tihe United States effectively molded the agreement to its will, persistently objecting when
other countries tried to make it stronger. But then it abandoned the treaty, seemingly
repudiating even those parts on which it had previously agreed.").
15. Barrett, supra note 5, at 244 ("It is widely acknowledged that Kyoto's emission limits
are inadequate... .").
16. Bruce Tonn, An Equity First, Risk-Based Framework for Managing Global Climate Change,
13 GLOBAL ENvTL. CHANGE 295, 297 (2003) ("It is the perception that emission caps were
negotiated with the intention of keeping emissions higher in the developed countries than in
developing countries far into the future, thereby maintaining existing international economic
inequalities.").
17. Lionel Barber, Transcript: Wen Jiaba, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 2, 2009, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/795d2bca-f0fe-1ldd-8790-0000779fd2ac.html.








One proposal for establishing a more just climate scheme is to replace
Kyoto's tentative distributive commitments with a policy mechanism that
recognizes the right to emit as belonging equally to each human being" -
an idea that has been termed "equal per capita allocation" (EPCA).21
Although, unsurprisingly, no politician in the United States or Europe has
taken seriously the idea of allocating emissions rights on a per capita basis,
the Indian government in particular has been particularly outspoken about
supporting this approach. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in his June
2008 speech on the release of India's first Climate Change Action Plan,
declared that "[e]very citizen of this planet must have an equal share of the
planetary atmospheric space. Long term convergence of per capita
emissions is, therefore, the only equitable basis for a global compact on
climate change." 22 Allocation of emissions rights, under this view, should
cease to reflect the economic muscle of the wealthiest nation states, and
should instead be conducted on a worldwide per capita basis.
This point of view, addressing what many regard as unabashed self-
serving behavior on the part of wealthy nations, is contrary to the
conception of rights and duties that shapes the existing treaty framework.
According to traditional social contract theory, the nation state is the
principal unit for systems of justice.3 John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, for
example, have argued that duties of justice are inherently political or
"associative," meaning that they arise only in the context of a nation state
21made up of citizens who are all subject to the coercive power of the state.
Thomas Nagel argues that state-centric associative duties should continue
to inform our view of justice, pointing out that, "[hiowever imperfectly, the
nation-state is the primary locus of political legitimacy and the pursuit of
justice, and it is one of the advantages of domestic political theory that
nation-states actually exist."" Nagel deepens his argument with the claim
that institutions other than the nation state - such as international
economic institutions - do not trigger associative duties because all of the
participants are not engaged in a collective activity that serves their mutual
19. See, e.g., UNFCCC, Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action, Ideas
and Proposals on the Elements Contained in Paragraph I of the Bali Action Plan 19, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.1 (Mar. 13 2009) (China's Views on the Fulfillment of the Bali
Action Plan and the Agreed Outcome To Be Adopted by the Conference of the Parties at Its
15th Session).
20. AUBREY MEYER, CONTRACTION & CONVERGENCE: THE GLOBAL SOLUTION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE 55 (2001) ("[T]he world's atmosphere belongs equally to everyone if it belongs to
anyone at all ..... ").
21. See Starkey, supra note 1, at 5.
22. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, Speech on Release of Climate Change
Action Plan (June 30, 2008), available at http://www.pmindia.nic.in/1speech.asp?id=690.
23. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE 92-93 (2006) (arguing that the
centrality of the nation state makes social contract theories inadequate for confronting
contemporary problems of global justice).
24. Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113, 120-21 (2005)
(discussing Rawls generally and citing RONALD DwORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 6 (2000)).
25. Id. at 113.
2010] 285
5
Saltzman: Distributing Emissions Rights in the Global Order: The Case for Equal Per Capita Allocation
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2010
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
advantage.16
Following the arguments of an established and expanding community
of global justice thinkers,' the emergence of an increasingly "globalized"
economy and political framework counsels rejecting Nagel's claim that
there are necessarily greatly divergent moral standards for national and
global economic justice. Because it is simply unacceptable to hold that
persons who suffer from inequality have no claim on their fellow human
beings, duties of justice must apply transnationally - particularly where
people are denied the opportunity to help shape the institutions that affect
them. This intuitive position allows for the possibility of institutional
change, but as yet does not prescribe a particular way in which such duties
apply. In the climate change context, the idea that duties of justice reach
across national borders suggests that climate negotiators cannot fulfill all of
their duties of justice by forming agreements that place as few demands as
possible on the citizens they represent, and underscores the need for a
different method of allocating emissions rights.
III. RETHINKING CONVENTIONAL VIEWS ON TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE
A. In Favor of Institutional Cosmopolitanism
The question of what demands people are entitled to make on each
other in response to climate change is a complicated one. It is clear that
climate change harms people. But what is it about these harms that triggers
duties on the part of those who emit high levels of greenhouse gases to
ensure that others are not harmed by their activities? The argument that
wealthy nations have caused climate change does not appear to provide
sufficient grounds for assigning responsibilities. As Coleman and Ripstein
point out, any appeal to causation or agency entails presuppositions about
the entitlements of the parties involved. Therefore, decisions about who
should bear the cost of a particular misfortune require making substantive
decisions about what constitutes "reasonable" behavior.' Such an analysis,
familiar from the fault system in tort law, involves an account of "the
liberty and security interests that are at stake, which in turn depends on the
importance of the activity in which the defendant is engaged and the
significance of the ... interest that might be injured."'
In order to proceed with an account of responsibility for climate
change, it is necessary to be able to compare coherently the high-emitting
activities in which developed countries are engaged with the interests of
26. Id. at 138.
27. See, for example, the work of contributors to GLOBAL ETHICS: SEMINAL ESSAYS
(Thomas Pogge & Keith Horton eds., 2008).
28. Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 3, at 107.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 91.
[Vol. 13286
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developing countries: "[o]nly when we know what each of us owes the
other can we determine who owns the costs of misfortunes that arise in the
course of our interactions."" The broad social importance of
disproportionate emitting activities relative to the liberty and security
interests of persons in developing countries helps define the permissibility
of those activities, and in turn contributes to determining the appropriate
degree of care." Already, repeated appeals to CBDR in the UNFCCC
documents express at least some level of acknowledgment on the part of
high-emitting countries that the current distribution is unjust.3
In his influential work on human rights, Thomas Pogge argues that the
current transnational character of markets and property rights places us in
a global institutional order, involving such institutions as the territorial
state, a system of international law and diplomacy, and a global economic
system.' According to Pogge, common participation in a single global
institutional order makes unfulfilled human rights everyone's
responsibility.35 In developing this theory, which he calls "institutional
cosmopolitanism," Pogge borrows the concept of "associative" duties from
Rawls, but finds that such duties exist in contexts other than national
society. In the same way that citizens of a nation state are entitled to certain
rights because the state claims authority over them, persons who are
subject to the rules of the global institutional order have certain
entitlements under that order.
Pogge suggests that wealthy nations behave unjustly where they cause
foreseeable and avoidable harms that violate people's "basic interests." But
can poverty- or climate change-induced harms really be attributed to the
global institutional order? Mathias Risse, for example, finds it implausible
that the global order is responsible for the fact that more deaths occur in a
state of poverty than in an "ideal state of affairs." Instead, Risse points out
that, for most of human history, "the overwhelming majority of people
lived in utter misery."" Rather than indicting transnational institutions for
failing to do more for the world's worst-off, he praises the "global
governance"' of the last fifty years, which saw the advent of the U.N. and
the Bretton Woods institutions." This is, he says, "the first time ...
humankind has engaged in something resembling potentially all-inclusive
collective problem-solving," and the result is that "the human race has
never been better off, and it has never been better armed with the
technological prowess, medical knowledge, and intellectual tools to fight
31. Id. at 96.
32. Id. at 114.
33. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
34. POGGE, supra note 2, at 177.
35. Id.
36. Mathias Risse, How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor?, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 349, 369
(2005).
37. Id.
38. Risse defines "global governance" as the network of organizations that make up the
global order Pogge describes. Id. at 350.
39. Id. at 370.
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poverty."40 Recalling Coleman and Ripstein's analysis, Risse would draw
the line such that most poverty-related harms are allowed to lie where they
fall.
In contrast to Pogge's duty to reform the global institutional order such
that foreseeable harms are avoided, Risse posits a limited "duty to
assistance in institution building."4 ' The main difference between these two
approaches is that Risse recognizes only a minimal duty to help persons in
other countries, while Pogge promotes a deeper duty to protect a
reasonable set of basic interests for all people - even those who are not
members of one's own nation state. But even on Risse's own terms, the
governments of wealthy nations have spectacularly failed their "duty to
assistance in institution building" by turning a blind eye to oppressive
regimes in resource-rich countries - a trend that Pogge calls the "resource
privilege." 42 According to the resource privilege, wealthy nations are
willing to recognize corrupt governments in developing countries in order
to obtain the resources required for sustaining existing levels of
consumption, thus perpetuating bad governance situations and grossly
unfair distribution of economic benefits to citizens of these countries.
Corrupt governments in many countries have been able to enrich
themselves while failing to eradicate poverty or improve economic
growth. Where the resources obtained are fossil fuels, the citizens of these
countries are harmed even further through the overproduction of
greenhouse gas emissions on the part of persons in wealthy nations.
B. Duties in the Context of Climate Change
In a world where most large-scale economic transactions reach across
national borders, it is intuitively difficult to be satisfied with a duty that
provides no real improvement for the people who are harmed by such
transactions. On Coleman and Ripstein's terms, the failure on the part of
powerful nations to improve economic ground rules seems
"unreasonable"" because it disproportionately privileges the interests of
the most fortunate over those of the world's worst-off. Certainly there is a
long history of "economic ground rules"" that harm individuals in direct
and deplorable ways. The international slave trade is an obvious example.
Yet in the same way that the spread of democratic values eventually led
previous generations to view slavery as an abhorrence, the emergence of
truly global problems like climate change may now teach us to view as
unjust the imposition of a coercive global institutional order on persons
who lack a meaningful means of political participation for shaping that
40. Id.
41. Mathias Risse, What We Owe to the Global Poor, 9 J. ETHics 81, 82 (2005).
42. POGGE, supra note 2, at 120.
43. Id.
44. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
45. POGGE, supra note 2, at 182.
[Vol. 13288
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Before proceeding to an account of how climate change harms are
expressive of existing injustices, it will be useful to provide a description of
these harms and how they are geographically distributed. Research by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) shows that
temperature increases are already having adverse effects on natural and
human systems." The IPCC reports, further, that circumstances are
expected to worsen dramatically by the end of this century." Freshwater
resources will change significantly as temperature changes exacerbate
droughts in dry areas and flooding in others." Crop productivity is
expected to decrease at lower latitudes. 9 In Asia and Africa, coastal
flooding is projected to be especially severe.' Poorer communities will be
especially vulnerable to these changes not only because of their
geographical location, but also because of their limited capacity for
adaptation.5 ' These populations will see increases in malnutrition, with
consequences for child growth and development; increased deaths, disease
and injury due to heat waves, floods, storms, fires, and droughts; increased
diarrheal disease; increased frequency of cardiorespiratory diseases due to
higher concentrations of ground-level ozone; and altered distribution of
vectors for infectious diseases.52
In response to such changes, claims of environmental human rights
have become more prevalent in the last few years. A December 2005
petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights - submitted
by Inuit leader and Nobel Peace Prize nominee Sheila Watt-Cloutier, the
Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), and Earthjustice -
describes the effects of climate change on Inuit tribes as harms caused by
disproportionate consumption of greenhouse gases by the United States.
The petition claims that the United States is "obligated under international
law to take responsibility for its contributions to global climate change both
by limiting emissions and by paying reparations to those that it has
harmed and continues to harm.",s In her testimony before the Commission,
Watt-Cloutier explained that extreme weather events, loss of sea ice, and
changing disease vectors are threatening the "rights to life, health, property
and means of subsistence" for the Inuit and other geographically and
economically vulnerable groups.
46. Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPAcTS, ADAFTATION AND
VULNERABILITY 8 (M.L. Parry et al. eds, 2007) available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm [hereinafter IPCC Summary].
47. Id. at 11.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 12.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Sheila Watt-Cloutier et al, Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human
Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and
Omissions of the United States, 103 (Dec. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ICC-Petition 7DecO5.pdf [hereinafter Inuit Petition].
54. Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Testimony before the Inter-American Commission on Human
2010]1 289
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The Male' Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate
Change, signed in November 2007 by the Small Island Developing States,
makes similar claims about environmentally-related human rights
violations. The Male' Declaration emphasizes the disproportionate
vulnerability of small island, low-lying coastal, and atoll states to the
effects of climate change, and demonstrated concern that climate change
"has clear and immediate implications for the full enjoyment of human
rights including inter alia the right to life, the right to take part in cultural
life, the right to use and enjoy property, the right to an adequate standard
of living, the right to food, and the right to the highest attainable standard
of physical and mental health ... "
While neither the right to a clean environment nor the right to "take
part in cultural life" has been clearly acknowledged by the international
community," some scholars argue that the scope of generally accepted
human rights must be expanded beyond conventionally recognized rights
- most of which are rooted in a traditionally European conception of
property - if we are to protect the subsistence and way of life of those who
are most vulnerable to climate change." These examples serve to illustrate
that the nature and magnitude of existing global problems, including
climate change, necessitate a discussion about what kinds of duties these
problems might create, and who is responsible for discharging those
duties.
It is at least generally acknowledged that climate change-induced
harms are taking place, and that they will continue to worsen. Pogge
convincingly argues that global poverty can be traced to the structure of
the existing global institutional order; climate change harms are, arguably,
traceable to the same origin. Further, some have asserted that the harms
resulting from climate change rise to the level of fundamental rights
violations, calling in turn for international recognition of duties on the part
of those who benefit from global institutions to (1) aid those who are being
harmed and (2) strive to transform the status quo. The next Part begins to
construct a framework for identifying the duties that arise as a result of
climate change. A just remedy should transform the existing framework for
allocating emissions rights, taking into account the related needs for
political access and equitable consumption.
Rights (Mar. 1, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.earthjustice.org/library/legal-docs
/testimony-before-iachr-on-global-warming-human-rights-by-sheia-watt-cou tier.pdf).
55. Male' Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change, Nov. 14, 2007,
available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/MaleDeclarationNov07.pdf [hereinafter
Male' Declaration].
56. See, e.g., Rania Rampersad, Note, Indigenous Adaptation to Climate Change: Preserving
Sustainable Relationships Through an Environmental Stewardship Claim & Trust Fund Remedy, 21
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 591,596-97 (2009).
57. See, e.g., Eric Dannenmaier, Beyond Indigenous Property Rights: Exploring the Emergence
of a Distinctive Connection Doctrine, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 53 (2008).
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IV. THE QUESTION OF REDISTRIBUTION
Pogge's indictment of the existing global order is helpful to a
discussion of climate change for two main reasons. First, the UNFCCC is a
classic example of the international negotiation framework that Pogge
criticizes for allowing wealthy states to exert a "crushing advantage in
bargaining power. . . ."' Second, development level has been a major factor
in assigning emissions reduction targets. This Part suggests that the
compensation mechanism Pogge proposes for implementing institutional
cosmopolitan principles is an inadequate expression of those principles,
especially in the context of climate change.
A. Insufficiency of Compensatory Remedies: The Right to Political
Participation
Having recognized a duty on the part of those who benefit from global
institutions to transform these institutions such that "radical inequality" is
eliminated, Pogge proposes an institutional mechanism for fulfillment of
that duty called the Global Resources Dividend (GRD)." Under the GRD,
users of natural resources would be required to pay a consumption tax
whose revenues would be redistributed to those who are being harmed by
the existing global order.
In Pogge's view, wealthy nations incur a duty to ensure that the "basic
interests" of all individuals are promoted.' The set of interests he proposes
is not limited to life-sustaining needs, such as nutrition, medical care, and
sanitary conditions, but includes social and political rights: education,
meaningful political participation, and a fair legal system." This emphasis
on social relations suggests that Pogge is arguing for duties that are
broadly egalitarian rather than limited to basic humanitarian concerns.
Most importantly, Pogge posits a universal right to political participation:
what he calls the "equal opportunity requirement." 62 One could argue that
the equal opportunity requirement has long been enshrined in
international law. In 1986, the United Nations adopted the Declaration on
the Right to Development, "recognizing that the creation of conditions
favourable to the development of peoples and individuals is the primary
58. POGGE, supra note 2, at 27.
59. Id. at 202. See also id. at 202-20 (discussing how the GRD proposal presents viable
alternative ways of organizing the global economic order).
60. Id. at 203.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 193. There is some concern with a discussion of "equal opportunity" for
countries where the climate change duties in question apply to persons. For the purposes of
this Note, however, it is expedient to assume that national governments will adequately
advocate for the rights of their citizens. There are remaining ethical concerns where persons
have either insufficient influence over their countries' role in shaping international policy or
insufficient political influence domestically; however, a deeper discussion of these problems is
beyond the scope of this Note.
2010] 291
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responsibility of their States."6 Insofar as states are unfairly disadvantaged
by the ground rules that govern the global institutional order, national
governments are rendered unable to fulfill their legal responsibility to
create those conditions necessary for development, which is acknowledged
by the international community to be an "inalienable human right."'
These two threads - a duty of compensation on the one hand, and a
right to political participation on the other - are somewhat incongruous.
Pogge criticizes the existing international negotiation framework because it
prevents many individuals from exercising their right to political
participation in a meaningful way - thus violating the equal opportunity
requirement. But the solution he proposes allows this very framework to
remain largely intact. Compensation, by definition, provides a remedy for
harmful or unjust behavior that has already occurred, and may be
understood to sound more in corrective than distributive justice. Although
subjected to new price pressures under the GRD in the form of a
consumption tax, wealthy nations would likely retain much of their
existing ability to consume disproportionate levels of natural resources.
Even if the tax were high enough to effect a major wealth redistribution, as
Pogge himself acknowledges, the GRD would confer "no right to
participate in decisions about whether or how natural resources are to be
used and so does not interfere with national control over resources, or
eminent domain."5 If existing property rights create the problem of unjust
distribution in the first place, a solution that leaves this scheme largely
intact would allow for continued injustice even as it addresses economic
inequalities.
Certainly Pogge treats the GRD as a "step" toward global justice, not a
total solution.' Similarly, compensatory measures are likely to be a
necessary component of any solution to climate change. 7 But forming a
solution that relies wholly on compensating developing countries for
economic inequalities that make it more difficult to cope with climate
change, or for the costs of employing low-carbon technologies, accords too
little weight to the right of all countries to participate in forming a global
solution. Egalitarian demands do not simply apply to the pursuit of just
63. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/41/128/Annex (Dec. 4, 1986).
64. Id. art. 1.
65. POGGE, supra note 2, at 203.
66. Id. at 210.
67. See, e.g., Poznan Climate Change Conference (COP-14), Dec. 1-12, 2008, Ideas and
Proposals on the Elements Contained in Paragraph I of the Bali Action Plan: Submissions from
Parties: Addendum 26-27, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.1 (Nov. 21, 2008)
("[T]o the extent that the incremental lifetime costs of investment in adaptation and mitigation
are positive, they would have to be fully recompensed if economic and social development
and poverty alleviation are not to suffer."), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/awglca4/eng/misc5aOl.pdf; see also Juliet Eilperin &
David A. Fahrenthold, Signs of Hope Emerge at Climate Change Conference: Overtures on Both
Sides, WASH. PosT, Dec. 17, 2009; Evan Osnos, Green Giant: Beijing's Crash Program for Clean
Energy, NEW YORKER, Dec. 21 & 28, 2009, at 65; Natasha Loder, Filthy Lucre Fouls the Air,
ECONOMisT, Dec. 12, 2009, at 66.
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outcomes or allocations, but also require treating all participants with
equal respect. In an important essay on equality, Elizabeth Anderson
suggests one reason why redistribution of material resources alone may
not be an adequate expression of egalitarian principles. Anderson
structures her discussion as a critique of "luck egalitarianism"" - a theory
of equality that calls for the nullification of natural imbalances in the
distribution of advantage. The idea of equalizing luck is intuitively
attractive in that it comes from an "apparently humanitarian impulse."'
This view of equality, however, potentially misses out on what Anderson
argues is the most fundamental egalitarian goal - the expression of "equal
respect and concern for all citizens." 0 In a similar line of argument, Samuel
Scheffler explains that equality is generally understood to be "a social and
political ideal that governs the relations in which people stand to one
another" - not a claim that "there is something that must be distributed or
allocated equally. . . ."7 A relational conception of equality is particularly
useful in the context of institutional cosmopolitanism, where the basic
claim is that associative duties apply among people who participate in
shared economic and political institutions. If international duties are
indeed associative in the way that Pogge claims, it makes sense to ground
redistribution in the structuring of social relations as they are expressed
through international institutions.
Under the existing institutional framework, successful negotiations on
behalf of wealthy countries result in more poverty-induced harms.7 In
addition, the willingness of the governments of wealthy countries to
recognize corrupt governments of resource-rich countries sustains
oppressive regimes in the developing world. Harmful conditions in
developing countries, then, are not attributable to national factors alone,
but are sustained by the economic ground rules of the global order. The
injustice of the global order is the perpetration of this harm on individuals
who are unable to defend themselves - in Pogge's words, "the imposition,
by our governments in our name, of a coercive global order that
perpetuates severe poverty for many who cannot resist this imposition."7
The GRD proposal focuses too much on ex post reforms on the part of
those who possess both the greater means and the greater political
influence. This imbalance is surprising given Pogge's convincing case for
expanded political participation. Institutional cosmopolitanism is attractive
because it grounds rights and duties in a description of the existing global
institutional order. A posited right to "equal opportunity for political
participation" is similarly convincing because it is rooted in a vision of
global institutions that affect the lives of individuals in a direct sense.74
68. Elizabeth Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHics 287, 289 (1999).
69. Id. at 290.
70. Id. at 295.
71. Samuel Scheffler, What is Egalitarianism?, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (2003).
72. POGGE, supra note 2, at 27.
73. Id. at 30.
74. Id. at 191.
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Depending on whether national governments are able to distribute
funds effectively among their citizens, it is possible that a meaningful
wealth-transfer mechanism would gradually increase the economic power
and, in turn, the political influence of individuals in developing countries.
But it is more likely that the kind of "moderate proposal"' that Pogge
suggests would fail to result in extensive reform. Those who, unlike Pogge,
endorse the existing international negotiating framework, are usually
willing to acknowledge the existence of basic humanitarian duties even
where they reject deeper duties of redistribution. Limited wealth transfers
may be acceptable to wealthy nations, which would be able to claim
fulfillment of their redistributive duties while still retaining
disproportionate economic power. Even a more committed egalitarian
distribution of resources may be compatible with social hierarchy so long
as a powerful actor retains control over their allocation.7 Compensatory
mechanisms like the GRD, if not coupled with mechanisms to ensure equal
participation in shaping the global order, may leave intact existing
hierarchies, thus failing their own equal opportunity requirement and
missing the opportunity to shape "a social order in which persons stand in
relations of equality" - what Anderson argues is the proper end of any
egalitarian project.78
The GRD proposal is an unquestionable improvement on the status
quo in its expression of institutional duties: tying development aid to
consumption at least conceptualizes existing inequalities as a function of a
global order that is organized according to the interests of economically
powerful states. Pogge repeatedly emphasizes the little that would be
required to address "radical inequality," apparently treating the minimal
burden as grounds for the feasibility of his proposal. But if all who are
affected by the global institutional order had truly meaningful access to the
political process, it is difficult to believe that the policy solution emerging
from this transformed global order would simply allow wealthy nations to
continue consuming disproportionate amounts of natural resources. If
developing nations were given their due in political influence under the
equal opportunity requirement, the resulting policy change would most
likely provide for a redistributive scheme that would not only reach
beyond radical inequality, but would reduce or even eventually preempt
the need for compensation.
B. Restricting Consumption
A compensation mechanism like the GRD fails a goal of equal
treatment for all countries because it does not address problems of political
75. Id. at 210.
76. See supra Section IIA, discussing the difference between humanitarian duties and
demands of justice.
77. Scheffler, supra note 71, at 36.
78. Anderson, supra note 68, at 313.
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access. In addition, it fails to promote an equal policy outcome because it
does not address the pressing need to reduce global consumption of fossil
fuels. Reducing global emissions, moreover, risks producing further
inequality unless the underlying distribution of entitlements that drives
both economic and environmental inequality is transformed. Although the
GRD provides redistribution needed for eradicating extreme poverty, it
does not adequately address the overconsumption of natural resources by
members of wealthy nations. Pogge treats the GRD's effect on consumption
levels as an attractive co-benefit,7 but is mostly concerned with the limited,
albeit significant, project of ensuring that all individuals can meet their
basic needs. Finding an egalitarian solution to climate change, however,
requires directly addressing over-consumption.
It could be argued that the purpose of the GRD is to address global
poverty - not to prevent climate change or to solve all major global
problems. The GRD might be sufficient to address radical inequality, while
other tools - perhaps similarly justified by institutional cosmopolitanism -
could be used to mitigate climate change. It is problematic, however, to
conceive of two separate redistributive mechanisms for addressing climate
change and global poverty. Even if, as Nagelr and Risse' argue, the global
institutional order does not require implementing full cosmopolitan duties,
the nature of climate change as a global problem gives rise to a set of duties
that applies transnationally. It is non-controversial that all human beings
have a right to meet their basic needs. Thus, insofar as persons in
developing countries should not have to restrict their consumption, those
in developed countries must incur a duty not to consume fossil fuels at
levels that cause others to be harmed.
A systemic lack of political influence on the part of the world's worst-
off provides grounds for a deep egalitarian critique of the global
institutional order. At the same time, there may be some cases where
important political principles require redistribution of resources, even
without reaching the question of whether the decision about how to
allocate them satisfies the equal opportunity requirement. Accordingly,
Daniel Markovits suggests that Anderson and Scheffler's emphasis on
relational equality may be overstated.8 2 Markovits is primarily focused on
political solidarity within nation states, as promoted through the state's
distribution of advantages in a way that is morally non-arbitrary. Yet some
of his principles are applicable in the international context as well.
Markovits argues that
[a] state that asserts the authority to sustain distributions that
advantage some citizens and disadvantage others in morally
79. Offering four arguments for why the GRD proposal is compelling, Pogge lists changes
in consumption last. POGGE, supra note 2, at 217-18.
80. See supra Part II.
81. See supra Section III.A.
82. See Daniel Markovits, Luck Egalitarianism and Political Solidarity, 9 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 271 (2008).
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arbitrary ways - that purports to obligate both the advantaged and
the disadvantaged to support such distributions - implicitly treats
the advantaged as more worthy than the disadvantaged, even
though there are no morally respectable grounds for making this
judgment.'
A state's continued support for global institutional rules that advantage
wealthy nations over poor ones is similarly morally arbitrary, and the
unequal distribution effected by such rules may provide grounds for
egalitarian redistribution in its own right.
The purpose of the GRD is wealth redistribution: individuals in
wealthy nations would consume less - therefore producing fewer
greenhouse gas emissions - while those in developing nations would
acquire the means to develop and begin to consume more. The GRD
provides for minimal convergence of consumption levels, but it does not
provide for the contraction in global consumption needed to avoid
unequally distributed harms.' For a redistributive mechanism to (1)
address problems of economic inequality that currently plague climate
change negotiations while (2) preventing the unequal effects of
catastrophic climate change, it must not only give developing countries the
means to develop such that poverty is eradicated, but it must also reduce
total global emissions such that climate change-related harms are
prevented. Global emissions reductions must be achieved both through the
development and deployment of low-emission technologies - as financed
by wealthy nations - and through restricting consumption on the part of
those same countries.
V. EQUAL PER CAPITA ALLOCATION
Even if a GRD-like tax were increased to provide for more extensive
redistribution of economic resources, as a compensatory mechanism it
would fail to satisfy the basic principles of institutional cosmopolitanism.
Participants in the global institutional order are entitled not simply to
compensation for continuing exposure to an unjust distribution, but also to
the political access rights necessary to help shape that order such that
harms do not occur in the first place. Political access is especially important
in the context of climate change, where limiting global emissions in an
equitable manner requires making a decision as an international
community. Further, even if cosmopolitan duties are left aside, the GRD
does not adequately address the problem of global overconsumption.
These criticisms suggest that what is needed to provide a just remedy for
climate change is not a minimally redistributive mechanism such as the
GRD, or even a more committed compensation scheme, but rather a tool
83. Id. at 285.
84. See MEYER, supra note 20 (discussing "contraction and convergence" of greenhouse gas
emissions levels among nations).
296 [Vol. 13
16
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 13 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol13/iss1/5
2010] Distributing Emissions Rights 297
that goes beyond remedial compensation to reduce consumption and
related inequalities in the first instance.
Part I of this Note raised the concept of equal allocation of emissions
rights (EPCA) as an alternative to the existing negotiation framework. It is
not surprising that EPCA receives little attention in the context of
international climate negotiations, since it represents an extreme departure
from the existing treaty process. The rationale that is generally given for
EPCA is simply that each human being has an equal right to the
atmosphere." This argument involves the same problem that arises in
claims for a fundamental right to a clean environment: unless and until
powerful governments recognize the right that is being claimed, it will
carry little weight. The argument for an equal right to the atmosphere,
moreover, is problematic in that there is no generally recognized equal
right to any natural resource. Interestingly, however, EPCA not only
satisfies the equal opportunity requirement, but also contains more
potential than GRD-like mechanisms for restricting global emissions. EPCA
is therefore potentially better able to satisfy the requirements of
institutional cosmopolitanism.
Let us first consider the claim that EPCA is the best way to facilitate
development in poorer countries, providing for egalitarian economic
redistribution at the same time that overall global emissions are being
reduced. Why, for example, does it make sense to focus on equalizing the
right to emit greenhouse gas emissions when developing countries could
simply develop using cleaner, less carbon-intensive technologies?'
Employing clean technology will be an indispensable piece of any solution
to climate change. From a practical perspective, however, it is highly
unlikely that the technological infrastructure for clean energy production
can be deployed in time to avoid the worst effects of climate change while
both allowing wealthy countries to continue emitting at high levels and
helping poor countries develop rapidly. As the IPCC reports, climate
change is already producing adverse effects on human systems." Further,
from a fairness perspective, it is important to understand to whom cost
savings from clean technology would accrue. Thus far, development using
alternative technologies is far more expensive than development using
fossil fuels. This is one reason why China and India are resistant to capping
national emissions. As long as alternative technologies are expensive, using
wind power, solar power, and sophisticated high-efficiency equipment in
lieu of fossil fuels means, at least in the short term, slower economic
growth.' The cost savings that attach to clean development, then, would
85. See, e.g., id.
86. See NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2006) ("It
will also be cheaper to pursue emission cuts in countries that are in the process of making big
capital investments... . If they use low-emission technologies, emission savings can be 'locked
in' for the lifetime of the asset."), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/Chapter_10_MacroeconomicModelsofCosts.pdf.
87. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
88. See Osnos, supra note 67, at 65 ("As long as a Chinese citizen earns less than one-
seventh what his counterpart in America earns, China is unlikely to back down on the
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initially benefit wealthier nations by imposing upon them a lesser
responsibility to reduce greenhouse gas-emitting consumption.
Even if wealth transfers were implemented to reallocate cost benefits to
countries developing with clean technology, such a scheme in isolation
would echo the GRD's failure of both the equal opportunity requirement
and the need to change consumption patterns ex ante. Clean development
is necessary to establishing long-lasting, climate-friendly infrastructure;89
however, emphasizing technology to the exclusion of changing
consumption patterns is an endorsement of the existing negotiation
framework and the resulting unjust allocation.
EPCA satisfies the equal opportunity requirement in the sense that it
prevents any nation or group of nations from making decisions about
climate change mitigation while excluding from the decisionmaking
process those who are affected by global climate change. Where national
fossil fuel emissions are established under a set framework, EPCA
eliminates the ability of any country to exercise "crushing advantage in
bargaining power."' As current attitudes toward climate policy
demonstrate, it is highly unlikely that any country with international
political clout would use that power to implement EPCA. Further, EPCA
emphasizes emissions reductions on the part of high emitters. To the extent
that clean technology must be employed as poorer countries develop,
wealthy countries should provide compensation; but they should also
commit to phasing out high consumption patterns.
It may be true that EPCA would prevent poor nations from being
excluded from the decisionmaking process, and that it would provide for
global emissions reductions while also promoting economic growth in
poorer nations. But why does rejecting a minimally redistributive
mechanism like the GRD necessitate imposing full redistributive duties
under EPCA? Is there not a lesser degree of redistribution that could satisfy
both requirements? As Pogge argues, "[tihere are contexts ... in which we
act as a species and thus should decide together how to act."" This is
because, over the past few centuries, the development of more powerful
technologies has increasingly imposed significant harms on persons
beyond national borders, "thereby morally undermining - the
conventional insistence on an absolute right to national self-
demand that it should be paid to slow down its economy and invest even more in energy
technology.").
89. In fact, EPCA would create strong incentives to make advances in clean technology,
since continued economic advantage will depend on achieving economic growth that does not
rely on fossil fuels.
90. On the other hand, it could be argued that EPCA circumvents the equal opportunity
requirement altogether by removing the necessity for democratic participation: because
assigning an equal right to emit leaves no privileges left to be determined, EPCA in fact
frustrates democratic values instead of promoting them. As I will show in Part V, however,
democratic participation can take place in the realm of enforcement rather than in the initial
allocation of emissions rights.
91. POGGE, supra note 2, at 192.
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determination." 92 In these cases - one of the most dramatic of which is
climate change - using the existing negotiating framework to identify
solutions is impermissible because it excludes from the conversation those
who are significantly affected while allowing others to benefit
disproportionately.
If repeated negotiations are impermissible, it follows that there must be
a fixed solution that best approximates the interests of all. Anything less
than equal per capita allocation would amount to freezing the results of
one last exercise of bargaining power on behalf of those nations that are
currently able to exercise that power. Participants in the global institutional
order have associative rights and duties. Where the less well-off are given
true political access, such that they are able to help shape the global
institutions that affect them, it is difficult to believe that they would
approve a state of affairs that leaves them less able to benefit from fossil
fuel technologies than countries that developed earlier. Indeed, this
evaluation is at the heart of China's emphasis on a basic right to
development.93
EPCA would allow for global reductions sufficient to avoid the
harmful effects of climate change while simultaneously shielding those
who are less well off from unfair burdens of mitigation. Further, it would
satisfy the equal opportunity requirement by eliminating the existing
international negotiation framework, and would necessitate changes in
global consumption patterns that cease to give unfair advantages to the
wealthy. It therefore offers a solution for climate change harms while
addressing many of the economic inequality problems that currently
plague the climate treaty process.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
This Part makes three suggestions regarding the kind of institutional
change needed to implement a just climate policy. First, wealthy countries
have continued to increase consumption levels in spite of their Kyoto
targets by exporting emissions-intensive production to developing
countries. Thus, in order to ensure a meaningful redistribution of emissions
rights, a country's total emissions should be calculated with respect to
consumption rather than production. Second, linking enforcement to
international trade privileges would address equity concerns by helping to
rebalance power on the international stage. Finally, in order to avoid a
remedial regime under which wealthy nations are simply able to buy a
continued, unequal right to emit greenhouse gases, an EPCA compliance
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Poznan, Pol.
(COP-14), Dec. 1-12 2008, Ideas and Proposals on the Elements Contained in Paragraph I of the Bali
Action Plan: Submissions from Parties at 19, FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/Misc.1 (Mar. 13, 2009)
("The right to development of developing countries should be adequately and effectively
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regime should depend on sanctions rather than on compensation alone.
A. Equitably Calculating Equal Allocation
Having established that the right to emit greenhouse gases should be
equalized across national borders, it is important to understand which
activities will contribute to the calculation of a country's emissions. In other
words, how is an equal right to emit greenhouse gases to be expressed
through a practical accounting scheme? Fair implementation of EPCA
requires restructuring the existing accounting scheme for measuring a
country's greenhouse gas emissions. In recent years, Chinese politicians
have objected to criticism leveled at China for its high greenhouse gas
emissions on the grounds that a large portion of China's emissions-
intensive production occurs in response to market demand on the part of
wealthy nations.4 A 2008 study identified China as a "net exporter" of
greenhouse gas emissions, with nineteen percent of its production
emissions coming from exported goods in 2002, and expected to reach
thirty percent by 2006."
The practical effect of "exporting" emissions is that importing
countries are able to claim greater emissions reductions while still
engaging in high consumption, a process that has been called "abatement
through trade."96 Countries with high consumption levels are, in this sense,
receiving unfair credit for emissions reductions under Kyoto. At the same
time, China's gross domestic product (and that of other high-export
countries) is growing at a much slower rate than China's production
emissions output.' Regardless of the distribution mechanism that is
adopted, fair allocation of responsibility for climate change abatement
requires calculating a country's emissions based on the goods it consumes
rather than those it produces.
A logical objection to using consumption as the basis for assigning
responsibility for climate change is that it is not clear whether focusing on
consumption actually solves the problem of just allocation. It seems fair to
require the world's wealthiest peoples to pay for the negative effects of
their "overconsumption." But what about the role these "exported"
emissions have in developing the Chinese economy? In what sense would
it be better for China's workers if these production activities did not exist at
all?
94. See Jiahua Pan, Jonathan Phillips & Ying Chen, China's Balance of Emissions Embodied in
Trade: Approaches to Measurement and Allocating International Responsibility, 24 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL'Y 354, 355 n.2 (2008) (stating that the issue of consumption emissions was "first
raised on 4 June 2007 by Ma Kai, Director of the National Development and Reform
Commission, at a press conference on China's National Programme on Climate Change," and
was "reiterated at the Bali conference by his deputy, Xie Zhenhua, the head of the Chinese
delegation to [COP13]").
95. Id. at 364, 366.
96. Id. at 370.
97. Id. at 367.
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Although the Chinese economy is benefiting from foreign demand for
cheap imports, it seems incongruous to suggest that China should take
abatement responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions produced by
industries whose workers are some of the worst-compensated in the
world.' China may be benefiting in an absolute sense from the business
opportunities embodied in exported emissions. However, not only are
wealthy countries benefiting politically from claiming emissions reductions
and economically from purchasing cheaper goods, but also China's
consumption levels are growing much slower than the rate of its
production emissions. This characteristic of the Chinese economy suggests
that proportionally much of the economic benefit from China's greenhouse
gas-intensive production does not accrue to China in the form of economic
development, but rather to countries that are importing Chinese goods.
Implementing EPCA without switching to a consumption-based
accounting system would retain many of the equity problems of the
current system as long as countries like China continue to run a "balance of
emissions embodied in trade" (BEET), where emissions from production of
goods they consume are less than the emissions from domestic
production." An EPCA regime based on production emissions would
allow for redistribution; but, as in the current accounting scheme,
importing countries would reap a significant portion of the benefit. As
discussed above, persons in developing countries have a right not to be
harmed by climate change, and this right entails having a say in shaping
the institutions that structure allocation of emissions rights. Basing
accounting on production emissions frustrates the ability of export nations
to control their own responsibilities by allowing consumers in import
countries to drive the responsibilities of countries in which production
takes place. To the extent that it is skewed by the demand of wealthy
consumers, redistribution is no longer truly egalitarian.
B. Climate-Trade Linkage
Where the character of transnational economic interactions forms the
basis for global accounting, it makes sense to attach emissions target
compliance to trade rules on the enforcement side as well. In International
Trade and Labor Standards, Christian Barry and Sanjay Reddy argue that an
effective way to improve labor standards internationally would be to create
a "linkage" mechanism according to which countries that improve labor
standards would be granted greater access to international markets." On a
commonsensical level, labor standards should attach to international trade
98. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, International Comparisons of Hourly
Compensation Costs in Manufacturing, 2007 (Mar. 26, 2009), available at
http://www.bs.gov/news.release/pdf/ichcc.pdf.
99. Id. at 356.
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rules because import countries can be understood to possess some level of
responsibility for the working conditions of the people who produce the
goods that they choose to consume. Recalling the discussion of institutional
cosmopolitanism in Part II, consumers have a distributive duty to ensure
that international trade rules facilitate the implementation of better labor
standards in countries from which they buy goods - particularly where
those consumers benefit from cheaper prices.
Similar reasoning can lead to a conclusion that it makes sense to link
emissions target compliance to international trade rules: as suggested in
Part V.A, import countries can be understood to hold responsibility for the
emissions involved in producing the foreign goods they consume. Barry
and Reddy address a number of objections to linkage in the labor
standards context."o' Interestingly, re-applying the linkage concept in the
realm of emissions target compliance appears to avoid the most trenchant
of these objections.
A common objection to linkage is that it will hurt the people it is meant
to help by giving developing countries less access to international markets,
and depressing employment rates in these countries by increasing the cost
of labor.'0 2 In the climate context, however, developing countries would be
allowed to continue increasing their greenhouse gas emissions, while the
countries that would potentially be exposed to penalties for failing to meet
their emissions reduction targets under a linkage regime would be those
countries with the best means to survive those penalties. In addition,
opponents to linkage argue that it is politically imperialistic because it
unfairly imposes a specific moral vision on other cultural spheres.'o Under
this view, states should be able to choose their own institutions; further,
while poor labor practices are regrettable, they are a necessary byproduct
of rapid development, which will ultimately benefit the world's
disadvantaged. Climate change avoids this objection altogether. Under the
linkage regime that Barry and Reddy propose, wealthy countries would
allow increased trade concessions to developing countries where they
comply with labor standards imposed by the very politically powerful
countries providing the concessions." Climate change linkage, in contrast,
would likely result in curtailed market access for already-powerful
countries. Because such a scheme would result in a more equitable balance
of economic and political power among nations, it is able to avoid the
charge of being potentially imperialistic.
Barry and Reddy point out that a morally legitimate program for
institutional reform must do more than "serve morally valuable
objectives"; in addition, "the costs of implementing the reform must also be
distributed fairly."'" EPCA is a morally valuable objective in that it satisfies
101. See id. ch. 6 ("A Constructive Procedure - Identifying Linkage Proposals That Meet
the Standard Objections").
102. Id. at 12.
103. Id. at 19.
104. Id. at 28-29 (outlining the features of a feasible and desirable linkage regime).
105. Id. at 25.
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the distributive principles of institutional cosmopolitanism. Further, using
linkage to achieve EPCA allows the costs to be distributed fairly in a way
that linkage in other policy contexts may not.
C. Using Import Restrictions and Sanctions to Enforce EPCA
When considering what tools an international body should use to bring
about compliance with environmental standards under a linkage regime, it
should first be noted that the ability of countries to meet multilateral
environmental commitments may be limited under existing WTO law. In
Global Warming and the World Trading System, the Peterson Institute for
International Economics (PIIE) has addressed in detail the ways in which
domestic measures to address climate change or multilateral
environmental agreements might come into conflict with the WTO and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)." In response to such
concerns, Daniel Esty has suggested that the WTO could adopt a provision
- similar to one included in the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) - stating that trade measures taken in accordance with
environmental agreements do not violate the GATT.o7
Assuming that trade law could be revised to better accommodate
environmental measures, there are a number of enforcement options to
consider: "cessation and non-repetition," where the offending party simply
agrees voluntarily not to repeat the violation; compensation, which
Sungjoon Cho has identified as "the most liberal form of remedies";
restitution; and sanctions, the "remedy of last resort" under the Dispute
Settlement Understanding - the set of rules that governs the resolution of
trade disputes under the World Trade Organization (WTO).8 Of the
various policy instruments available for enforcing international law against
individual nation states, the tool that makes the most sense for ensuring
EPCA-compliance is the ability to impose sanctions on countries that fail to
comply with their emissions targets.
Cessation and non-repetition is obviously a problematic mode of
effecting compliance, since it involves no enforcement power and it is often
difficult to tell whether the offending party has really remedied the
situation or has merely "window-dressed the measure while keeping the
violative measure alive."" The Kyoto regime has shown that, in the climate
change context, cessation and non-repetition provides no meaningful
recourse for persons harmed by a country's failure to meet its emissions
106. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, STEVE CHARNOVITZ, & JISUN KIM, PETERSON INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 31-64
(2009).
107. Daniel C. Esty, Economic Integration and Environmental Protection, in THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONS, LAW, AND POLICY 155, 167 (Regina S. Axelrod, Stacey D.
VanDeveer & David Leonard Downie eds., 3d ed. 2010).
108. Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65 U. PIrr. L. REV.
763, 771-81 (2004).
109. Id. at 772.
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targets. Under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, sanctions are
imposed only if a WTO Member fails to provide satisfactory compensation
to a complaining party for its violation of WTO rules."o In the context of a
climate linkage regime, however, compensation and restitution are
problematic. Where a country may fulfill its duty simply by transferring
money to the harmed party, it effectively pays to maintain an unjust status
quo without being required to fulfill the deeper distributive duties
implicated in EPCA. In other words, a remedial program that relies on
compensation runs the risk of incentivizing efficient breach: wealthy
countries simply pay to continue polluting at disproportionate levels, thus
violating both the equal opportunity requirement and their duty to reduce
consumption.
Indeed, this threat has been widely emphasized by groups that object
to international carbon markets. Most notably, both indigenous groups and
the Brazilian government have vehemently objected to the creation of a
market for reduction of emissions from deforestation and degradation
(REDD), which would allow wealthy countries to pay forested nations to
avoid cutting down threatened forests. Developed countries have touted
REDD as an equity-promoting tool that would result in wealth transfers to
developing countries at the same time that it would provide cost-savings
for developed countries as they strive to reduce emissions. However,
"[t]here is widespread suspicion that industrialised countries want to use
REDD to let their own polluting industries buy their way out of
responsibility for climate change."' Arguments in favor of increased use of
compensation in the realm of international lawll2 fail to take into account
the importance of ensuring that developing countries not only receive
financial benefits, but also have a meaningful say in shaping international
policy.
This analysis of remedies leads to the WTO's "remedy of last resort,"
sanctions, which arguably should be more liberally used where trade
access is attached to compliance with an emissions reduction scheme. Barry
and Reddy argue that, in the labor context, linkage need not involve
sanctions, but can instead be achieved through offering trade advantages."3
This is not true in the climate context, however. Where wealthy countries
offer trade concessions to developing countries for improving labor
standards, they effectively compensate poor countries for the increased
costs that go along with imposing more stringent standards. In contrast,
where the countries whose behavior must be policed are wealthy countries
with high access to international markets, the tool used to ensure
compliance with international law must curtail these already broad
110. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Annex 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 354-55 (1994).
111. The Pressure for REDD, 79 DOWN TO EARTH (2008), available at
http://dte.gn.apc.org/79are.htm.
112. See, e.g., William J. Davey, Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement, 42
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 119 (2009).
113. BARRY & REDDY, supra note 100, at 5.
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The demonstrated unwillingness of developed countries to adopt
sufficiently stringent emissions caps shows that it would be infeasible to
implement EPCA through incentives only. Incentivizing compliance
through trade concessions would allow developed countries to retain much
of the discretion they have under the current climate treaty to decide to
what extent to comply with emissions caps. Trade incentive-based EPCA
would provide nominal improvement on the status quo, since its rules
would at least express egalitarian principles. But they would be unlikely to
effect a just distribution, and might even contain the potential for
decreased action: where wealthy nations no longer have to engage in a
bargaining process, they may have little impetus to engage in serious
thinking about how emissions reductions could be achieved. In Part V.A, I
argued that production-based accounting leaves wealthy countries with a
disproportionate ability to shape the mitigation responsibilities of other
countries. Similarly, incentive-based linkage would frustrate the twin goals
of reducing consumption and shifting the power balance such that
institutional rules succeed in protecting the less well-off.
Compensation-based remedies do not constitute a full solution to
climate change because they fail to transform the underlying allocation of
entitlements. In addition, it is infeasible to ensure compliance with EPCA
by offering trade concessions to countries that comply with emissions
targets, since under EPCA the countries with the most stringent caps
already have significant market access. Thus, appropriate
acknowledgement of the interests of those who are threatened by climate
change requires using restrictive measures to enforce EPCA.
In the environment context, there is some potential for imposing
restrictive measures that fall short of sanctions. Border tax adjustments or
import bans could be applied to goods that were produced using carbon-
intensive processes."' Such measures have the potential to shift
consumption patterns toward less carbon-intensive goods,115 and could be
effective as a transitional policy. However, because they target production
processes, they would be less useful under a consumption-based
accounting scheme. The most powerful, albeit controversial, tool for
ensuring compliance with an environment-trade linkage regime is
economic sanctions. A major advantage of sanctions is that they need not
attach to products that are harmful in a particular way, but can instead
target "innocent" products in an effort to change a country's
environmental practices."' In the environmental arena, sanctions have been
successfully used to curb whaling in Iceland, end Japanese drift-net fishing,
114. See DANIEL C. EsTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE
250 (1994) (discussing import bans based on production process, such as the U.S. ban on
Mexican tuna caught with dolphin-killing nets).
115. HUFBAUER, CHARNOVITZ & KIM, supra note 106, at 65 (discussing the "polluter haven"
problem).
116. ESTY, supra note 107, at 249.
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and protect sea turtles in the Gulf of Mexico." The PIIE authors note that,
in the climate change context, there has never been a "serious suggestion
that other countries could have legally imposed trade sanctions against the
United States," despite its being a "prominent slowpoke on the climate
issue over the past 10 years.""8 Given the need to pursue the several
important goals of reducing economic inequality while promoting equal
opportunity and reducing overconsumption, the potential for using
sanctions to enforce a just emissions allocation scheme merits greater
attention. Because existing international treaty authorization for
environment-related trade sanctions is not clear,"9 an important step
toward establishing meaningful enforcement tools would be to amend the
GATT to include a presumption against abrogation of environmental
agreements."
VII. CONCLUSION
In benefiting from the ground rules that shape the existing global
institutional order, politically and economically powerful nations incur a
duty of redistribution toward persons who are being harmed by the
disproportionate over-consumption of fossil fuels. In order to fulfill this
duty, the international community should adopt a climate regime that both
provides for equal per capita allocation of emissions rights, and is
supported by enforcement mechanisms that rebalance access to
international markets and ensure equal political participation in shaping
global institutions.
Policymakers have so far refused to take seriously the idea of EPCA.
But as long as institutional cosmopolitan duties remain under-expressed in
international climate agreements, there will remain a significant and
understandable risk of non-cooperation on the part of developing countries
whose rights will, in turn, be under-protected. The pressing importance of
finding a solution to climate change that both meaningfully includes all
countries in the decisionmaking process and reallocates consumption
rights fairly suggests that policymakers ought to consider EPCA more
seriously.
117. Id. at 249-50.
118. HUFBAUER, CHARNOVITZ & KIM, supra note 106, at 70.
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